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Abstract—Clients of permissionless blockchain systems, like
Bitcoin, rely on an underlying peer-to-peer network to send
and receive transactions. It is critical that a client is con-
nected to at least one honest peer, as otherwise the client
can be convinced to accept a maliciously forked view of the
blockchain. In such an eclipse attack, the client is unable
to reliably distinguish the canonical view of the blockchain
from the view provided by the attacker. The consequences of
this can be catastrophic if the client makes business decisions
based on a distorted view of the blockchain transactions.
In this paper, we investigate the design space and pro-
pose two approaches for Bitcoin clients to detect whether
an eclipse attack against them is ongoing. Each approach
chooses a different trade-off between average attack detec-
tion time and network load. The first scheme is based on the
detection of suspicious block timestamps. The second scheme
allows blockchain clients to utilize their natural connections
to the Internet (i.e., standard web activity) to gossip about
their blockchain views with contacted servers and their other
clients. Our proposals improve upon previously proposed
eclipse attack countermeasures without introducing any ded-
icated infrastructure or changes to the Bitcoin protocol and
network, and we discuss an implementation. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of the gossip-based schemes through rigor-
ous analysis using original Internet traffic traces and real-
world deployment. The results indicate that our protocol
incurs a negligible overhead and detects eclipse attacks
rapidly with high probability, and is well-suited for practical
deployment.
Index Terms—Eclipse attacks, Bitcoin client, gossip protocol.
1. Introduction
The invention of blockchains as a means of provid-
ing an immutable, trustless, and de-centralized ledger
promises to revolutionize monetary transfers alongside
other applications. It has enabled cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin [34] to grow without the need for a central
authority, and due to its transparency has applicability in a
broad range of fields including secure logging infrastruc-
tures [39], distributed timestamping [3], and micropay-
ment channels [21]. Any user can join the Bitcoin network
and view or add transactions to the distributed ledger.
Since the Bitcoin network is an overlay network [42] on
top of a public infrastructure (the Internet), a number of
attacks on the underlying network are inherited by the Bit-
coin network. For example, attacks on DNS servers arise
from a lack of proper authentication, or misaligned trust
between entities in the delegated DNS hierarchy. Most
Bitcoin clients, including the popular bitcoinj, depend on
DNS seeders [1] to resolve the symbolic names of peers
to their respective IP addresses. A recent survey reveal
that 95% of cryptocurrencies employ DNS seeding or IP
hard-coding which are censorship prone techniques [31].
If the DNS server used for name resolution by the client
is compromised or malicious, then the DNS cache can be
poisoned [37] to resolve the domain name to an attacker-
controlled IP address. Similar attacks can be launched
via insecure Internet core protocols like BGP. As dis-
cussed in the literature [28], [15], [33], [24], [26], [40],
such network-level vulnerabilities make Bitcoin clients
vulnerable to eclipse attacks, where an attacked client is
connected only to attacker-controlled peers.
In this paper, we propose two new protocols to help
Bitcoin clients detect whether they are being eclipsed. The
first protocol detects eclipse attacks by using suspicious
block timestamps – i.e., if the time between newly created
blocks is too high, then this indicates that the network has
been partitioned.
This protocol can be executed by any client in iso-
lation, however, our analysis shows that it takes around
2-3 hours for a client to be relatively sure that it is under
attack. To reduce the average attack detection times, we
also propose a ubiquitous gossip protocol in which the
client piggybacks gossip messages onto its connections to
protocol-running servers. This protocol does not require
any changes to Bitcoin or its peer-to-peer network. It
also requires minimal support from web servers to com-
municate a small number of Bitcoin block headers. A
server can be any host on the Internet that participates
in the gossip protocol as a service to the public, and
which contributes a small amount of data storage (in the
order of few kilobytes) to store the gossip messages. A
gossip message consists of a set of Bitcoin block headers.
The server receives these gossip messages as different
clients connect to it, and the server maintains the strongest
view of the blockchain it has seen yet. This view is then
passed to the connecting clients in exchange. The gossip
protocol can function in a passive or active mode. In the
passive mode, block headers are gossiped via inclusion
in the HTTP(S) traffic when a client makes a standard
web connection with the server. In the active mode, the
client initiates connections with known protocol-running
servers for the sole purpose of gossiping (to update its
view of the blockchain) before it conducts a wallet balance
check. We demonstrate the efficiency of our passive mode
attack detection via a thorough analysis of real-world
Internet traffic traces and show that, on average, the attack
detection happens in less than an hour, depending on
how many commonly-visited servers participate in the
protocol. This time duration is typically sufficient since
a block confirmation takes approximately one hour (due
to the 6 block confirmation rule [11], while in reality
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more confirmations may be required due to mining pool
centralization).
However, in active mode the detection is almost instan-
taneous, although additional connections with protocol-
running servers are necessary. These servers are identi-
fied through passive-mode gossiping. The requirements
and attack detection time for the proposed protocols are
summarized in Table 1.
Various countermeasures have been proposed in the
literature to detect eclipse attacks – these are discussed
in Section 3. Our goal is to improve on those approaches
by providing a practical solution for Bitcoin clients to
detect eclipse attacks. The main contributions of this paper
are to i) propose the first (up to our best knowledge)
lightweight and ubiquitous gossip protocol that can detect
eclipse attacks on Bitcoin clients, ii) present a fully passive
eclipse attack detection protocol based on “suspicious”
block timestamps which does not incur additional over-
head or server participation, iii) propose an implementa-
tion of the gossip protocols, and iv) thoroughly analyze
the effectiveness of our protocols using real-world network
traffic traces and blockchain data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background information on Bitcoin and eclipse
attacks. Section 3 reviews the related work. Section 4 pro-
vides an overview of the requirements and system model
for the proposed the eclipse detection protocols. Section 5
presents the timestamp-based protocol. Section 6 presents
our gossip-based protocol and analyzes the real Inter-
net traffic trace to demonstrate its efficiency. Section 7
discusses real-world deployment and privacy concerns
and Section 8 details the implementation and evalua-
tion. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Bitcoin and Eclipse Attacks
2.1. Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a distributed, peer-to-peer electronic pay-
ment system that enables Internet-based payments with-
out going through a centralized and trusted entity like
a financial institution [34]. A distributed copy of the
electronic transaction ledger is stored by multiple peers of
the Bitcoin network. Transactions are grouped into blocks,
and the blocks are cryptographically linked forming a
chain (called a blockchain). Bitcoin uses proof-of-work
(PoW) for its consensus mechanism. A number of peers
simultaneously attempt to solve a puzzle by finding a pre-
image of a cryptographic hash that satisfies the condition
of the puzzle. This process is called mining. A peer that
solves the puzzle broadcasts its block to other peers in the
network. Peers are incentivized to create blocks as they re-
ceive a block reward and transaction fees (in Bitcoin’s na-
tive cryptocurrency called bitcoin). Two concurrent blocks
can be mined and announced simultaneously, and in such a
case peers accept the block they receive first. This process
of disagreement between peers is called forking. Forking
in Bitcoin is resolved by all honest peers agreeing to
follow the strongest chain rule, where a chain with the
most PoW aggregated is considered to be the current one.
Bitcoin requires that a majority of computational power
(to mine blocks) belongs to honest parties, so that they
can resolve forks in their favor and hence prevent double-
spending attacks [41].
In Bitcoin, a block consists of two parts: the header [8]
and the list of transactions [7]. The Bitcoin header aggre-
gates the transactions and contains metadata – in particu-
lar, the following fields: timestamp, which is the (approx-
imate) time at which the block was created, prevHash,
which is the hash pointing to the block preceding the
current block (this effectively creates a chain and provides
an ordering to the blocks), and nBits, which encodes the
block’s difficulty requirement (i.e., the amount of PoW
effort required to find a solution hash to the mining puz-
zle). The difficulty is dynamically set every 2016 blocks
in a way to adjust the average block creation time to 10
minutes. At this rate, 2016 blocks would be created in
exactly 2 weeks. If it took more than 2 weeks to generate
the 2016 blocks, the difficulty is reduced by adjusting the
value of nBits. A time shorter than 2 weeks results in a
difficulty increase, and a longer time in a decrease.
Peers in the Bitcoin network can, depending on their
resource constraints, be categorized as mining nodes, full
nodes, or simplified payment verification (SPV) nodes.
Throughout the discussion, SPV nodes are also referred
to as lightweight clients, light clients or clients. A mining
node stores and verifies every block in the blockchain
and competes to mine new blocks. A full node is similar
to a mining node except that it does not work to mine
blocks. An SPV client is a node that stores the block
headers alone and verifies that a) each block header points
to the previous block header b) and each block header
was generated with the PoW required. Bitcoin aggregates
transactions within blocks in a way that allows SPV clients
(who only store block headers) to verify that any included
transaction is part of the blockchain. To check whether a
transaction has made it onto the blockchain, an SPV client
makes an API call to a full node to request a proof.
2.2. Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin
To handle the communication, Bitcoin introduces a
peer-to-peer Internet overlay network. When a peer at-
tempts to connect to the Bitcoin network, it first finds
initial (seed) peers via a DNS lookup to pre-defined
domain names. A successful DNS lookup allows the peer
to contact seed peers, which in turn return lists of their
known peers. The peer connects to these peers and can
hence start using the protocol. The security of a Bitcoin
client relies on its ability to connect to honest peers
in the Bitcoin network. Being connected to an attacker-
controlled Bitcoin network undermines the ability of the
client to view or transact on the honest ledger, which can
result in financial losses. The client may assume that it
received payment in exchange for goods and services, only
to realize later that the transaction was registered only on
the attacker-controlled blockchain and not the canonical
blockchain. Detecting such attacks is hence critical for
the security of Bitcoin clients.
Unfortunately, as the Bitcoin network relies on the
Internet, it inherits all its security drawbacks. Most promi-
nently, in eclipse attacks [28], [27] an adversary manages
to hijack all connections from an attacked client to other
peers in the network. The client’s view of the network
and information dissemination is fully under the control
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Infrastructure Support Required Network Load Attack Detection Time Refer to
Timestamp None None 3 hours Section 5
Gossip passive mode Servers Natural browsing traffic >1 hour Section 6active mode Servers Additional connections Immediate
Table 1: Comparison of the proposed eclipse attack detection protocols.
of the attacker. The attacker can provide a malicious view
of the Bitcoin blockchain to the client, which may include
transactions of bitcoins that have already been spent on the
unseen part of the blockchain’s canonical branch (this is
called a double-spend attack). A Bitcoin lightweight client
may be vulnerable to an eclipse attack through DNS cache
poisoning [37] involving the name resolution of Bitcoin
seeders [22], [9], or routing attacks where the Bitcoin
network is partitioned [15] and the peer eclipsed.
3. Related work
In this section, we investigate network-level attacks
on blockchain systems and their countermeasures from
the existing literature. Heilman et al. [28] studied and
presented the feasibility of an eclipse attack on the Bitcoin
network. They showed that it is viable for a powerful
adversary who controls a large number of public IPs to
monopolize all peer connections to a victim Bitcoin client
and consequently present a malicious Bitcoin blockchain
view. The ability of an adversary to use this vulnerability
to conduct selfish mining and double-spend attacks was
further discussed by Gervais et al. [25] and Nayak et
al. [35]. Another class of serious attacks is connected
to the BGP protocol which is one of the core Internet
protocols. Apostolaki et al. [15] demonstrated that the
Bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to BGP routing attacks
where an attacker controlling a small number of BGP
prefixes can partition the Bitcoin network by announcing
malicious BGP messages. To prevent such an attack, the
SABRE framework was proposed [14]. It is a secure
relay network which helps to protect against BGP routing
attacks by enabling the Bitcoin clients to connect to relay
nodes hosted at safe autonomous systems. To prevent
(D)DoS attacks on relay nodes this architecture requires
high-performant programmable network switches. Tran et
al. demonstrated that Bitcoin clients are vulnerable to
the Erebus attack [40], which is a data plane attack (in
contrast to the BGP routing attack, which is a control
plane attack) and hence requires no routing manipulation.
This makes it much more stealthy than previous attacks.
Here, an attacker who is able to control ASes that can
intercept traffic to a specific set of public IPs which
need not be Bitcoin client addresses can execute Erebus
attacks. However, in this study (as in all studies above)
a successful attacker needs to be powerful (controlling
a large number of public IPs or having access to BGP
routers). In contrast, Wu¨st and Gervais [43] as well as
Marcus et al. [33] showed the feasibility of an eclipse
attack on the Ethereum blockchain by exploiting vulner-
abilities in its peer-to-peer protocol where an attacker
needs only a small number of machines with public IPs
to compromise a victim. Recently, Loe and Quaglia [31]
presented a survey which shows that 95% of existing
cryptocurrenies are using censorship prone technique to
bootstrapping i.e to identify peers in the network. The
reason for this is attributed to code reuse of the five major
cryptocurrenies. Also, the survey highlight the fact that
32% of cryptocurrenies rely on a single DNS provider for
their DNS seeds leading to single point of failure. Finally,
they analyze censorship resilient techniques which was
found to be very inefficient with high latency overhead
and none of the cryptocurrenies were able connect using
this technique.
Although we are not aware of any work similar to ours,
the detection and prevention of attacks on blockchain light
clients is an active research topic. The popular Bitcoin
light clients add hard-coded checkpoint block headers [5],
[6] into their code bases. This helps to prevent malicious
miners from reorganizing large parts of blockchain to
produce a weaker view and present it to the light client.
The bitcoinj light client developers have mentioned a
proposal to detect eclipse attacks by analyzing the block
arrival rate [1], but there is no known implementation of
such a feature yet. In Section 5, we provide a detailed
study on the effectiveness of such a feature in protecting
light clients against eclipse attacks.
The fraud proofs by Mustafa et al. [13] help light
clients to identify invalid blocks and reject them. The
proposed data availability proofs support the light clients
to gossip small chunks of information about the block for
which it received a fraud proof. Therefore, the network
which consists of light clients and full nodes can rebuild
the complete block information to validate the proof.
However, this approach requires significant modifications
to the existing protocols and needs the support of a
threshold number of honest light clients. The protocol is
able to detect incorrect blockchain blocks, however, in
contrast to our scheme fraud proofs do not detect eclipse
attacks if the blocks have a valid content.
One research direction is to make light clients even
lighter such that they do not have to process entire chains.
Non-Interactive Proofs of Proof-of-Work (NIPoPoW) [29]
and FlyClient [32] help encode blockchains such that their
total PoW is expressed in a concise manner. For every
chain, light clients only need to download a small proof
from full nodes to make sure that their view is stronger
than all known alternatives. Unfortunately, these schemes
involve significant modifications to the Bitcoin protocol,
e.g., Bitcoin header modification. Also, the security of
NIPoPoWs is guaranteed only under certain parameter
settings and in some cases it involves multiple round-trip
communications between the light clients and full nodes,
which increases the overhead at the light client. Although
many of these issues were addressed in FlyClient, their
protocol modifications form an obstacle to adaptability.
Similar to the previous work, neither NIPoPoWs nor Fly-
Client can detect eclipse attacks by themselves – however,
if deployed they could minimize the overheads introduced
by our system.
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Conceptually, the most related work to ours is in the
context of monitoring the consistency of append-only cen-
tralized log servers as presented by Chuat et al. [19]. They
propose a protocol for monitoring the consistency of cer-
tificate logs [30], where web clients exchange signed log
statements via their HTTP(S) connections. This process
helps to find potential inconsistencies in log statements,
hence proving malice. An alternative approach for the
same problem was proposed by Nordberg et al. [36],
where web clients implement a feedback mechanism to
inform a domain about observed log statements for the
domain certificates. Due to the different setting, these
schemes are not applicable in our scenario.
4. Solution Overview
The objective of this work is to provide lightweight
methods for a Bitcoin light client to detect that it is being
subjected to an eclipse attack.
Our first observation is that if a Bitcoin light client is
under an eclipse attack, it is then impossible for it to detect
the attack via the Bitcoin network itself (as its view is
controlled by the adversary). Therefore, to facilitate detec-
tion of the attack, an external infrastructure is necessary.
However, deploying a new dedicated infrastructure is a
challenging task in practice. Therefore, the protocol would
ideally be implemented on top of a currently existing
infrastructure.
The second observation is that although the attacked
light client cannot itself learn that its blockchain view is
malicious, the attack is trivially detectable if any stronger
concurrent view of the blockchain is available to the
affected client. Permissionless blockchains, like Bitcoin,
do not introduce any trusted entities that could assert
which blockchain view is canonical. Instead they follow
the strongest chain rule, so given two conflicting views
of different strengths it is trivial to decide which is the
canonical one. Therefore, the deployed detection infras-
tructure can be implemented as a medium for exchanging
blockchain views between protocol participants. Every
participant can simply compare its local view with the
obtained one, detect any potential attack, and save the
strongest view as the current one.
The main idea behind our gossip-based protocols is
based on the observation that users of Bitcoin light clients
conduct standard network connections, like web browsing,
messaging, email, etc, even when their client is under
an eclipse attack. Therefore, if they were to be able to
exchange their blockchain views with contacted Internet
servers who would store only the strongest seen view, then
that could be the base for a detection system. The passive
gossip scheme only uses natural traffic for attack detec-
tion. By contrast, the active gossip scheme uses natural
traffic to learn of protocol-following nodes, and purposely
initiates connections with a subset of them during periods
of interest, i.e., when the user checks her wallet balance
via the client. The timestamp-based approach uses its own
principles, which will be discussed in Section 5. In the
remainder of this section we present our system model
and the requirements of our detection systems.
4.1. System Model
The main agents in our system are as follows:
• Server (S) is an Internet server that provides
services accessible to the public and supports our
protocol. Each server builds and stores its view of
the blockchain from the block headers supplied to
it by the clients when they establish a connection
with the server. Each client sends a partial consec-
utive view of its block headers to the server when
it connects to use its service.
• Lightweight Client (LC) (or just a client) is
an SPV node of the Bitcoin network. Each LC
obtains its view of the blockchain from the Bitcoin
network that it is connected to. An LC may be
under an eclipse attack, in which case it receives
a malicious view of the blockchain controlled by
an attacker. We assume that LCs beside Bitcoin
software run other programs (e.g., a web browser)
and conduct user-driven Internet connections (e.g.,
browsing or messaging). In this work we focus
on light clients as they are the most popular and
convenient way for regular users to interact with
the Bitcoin network. However, our protocol can be
also run by other Bitcoin clients, e.g., full nodes.
• Attacker is a malicious entity able to launch an
eclipse attack on Bitcoin clients. The adversary
may control (either directly or indirectly) enough
mining power to construct an inferior branch pre-
fixed with the canonical view of the blockchain
in an attempt to masquerade as the canonical Bit-
coin blockchain. The objective of the attacker is
to partition the view of the Bitcoin network and
provide a malicious view of the blockchain to the
LC unnoticed. We assume that the adversary is
not able to generate a stronger blockchain than
the honest participants (or else the attacker could
perform a so-called 51% attack without the need
to eclipse clients).
4.2. Requirements
In order to realize a successful detection framework,
we define the following requirements:
Effectiveness: participants of the detection framework
should be able to detect ongoing eclipse attacks
with high probability and speed. As in Bitcoin, the
suggested transaction confirmation time is about one
hour (i.e., six new-coming blocks after the transaction
was appended), we aim for a similar time frame for
attack detection.
Low overheads: protocol-introduced overheads should
be negligible. In particular, the scheme should not
require high CPU, memory, and storage utilization,
and it should not introduce high bandwidth overheads
or latency inflation into the existing client-server
communications. The protocol should support a va-
riety of light clients, including resource-constrained
nodes like IoT devices.
Deployability: the protocol should be deployable with-
out any dedicated network infrastructure. Thus, the
protocol should not incur any significant investments
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or setup efforts. It should use the existing infrastruc-
ture with minimal or no changes to the applications
deployed on it.
Backward compatibility: the scheme should not require
any changes to the Bitcoin protocol or its network.
As witnessed from past developments and deploy-
ments, the Bitcoin community is reluctant to intro-
duce changes to the protocol, so if such a change is
required then it could undermine the deployment of
the attack detection framework.
5. The Timestamp-Based Protocol
The first eclipse attack detection protocol that we
present is fully passive and requires only the block time-
stamps, which are part of the block headers and there-
fore known to the light clients by default. Of the three
presented approaches, this one has the slowest average
detection time, but it is the easiest to implement as it
does not depend on protocol-running servers.
During an eclipse attack, an attacker can convince
a lightweight client to accept an inferior branch of the
blockchain. However, to build such a branch the attacker
will still need to control, either directly or indirectly, a
considerable amount of mining power. Since Bitcoin’s
mining difficulty changes infrequently, the difficulty can
be assumed to remain constant for the duration of the
attack. Since the attacker cannot create blocks at the same
frequency as the whole network, a sudden increase in
the block creation times is likely. The lightweight client
bitcoinj has indicated that in the future, it may implement
a “red alert” mode based on the block creation times [1].
To the best of our knowledge, none of the lightweight
clients have implemented such a feature yet, so we present
our timestamp-based protocol in this section.
5.1. Block Timestamp Model
Alerts in the timestamp-based approach are triggered
by abnormally long block creation times. Since block
creation times are random by nature, we need a probabilis-
tic model. The time between block creations follows an
exponential distribution [20], so the time needed to create
k blocks in a row follows the Erlang distribution with
shape parameter k and a mean of k ·10 minutes. However,
day-to-day changes in the total network hash rate mean
that these assumptions are not always valid. We inves-
tigate this using historical block timestamp observations
and hash rate estimates that were obtained via the data
API of blockchain.com.1 In particular, we collected
timestamps for the blocks between height 506000 and
560013, which were mined on Jan. 25, 2018 and Jan. 25,
2019 respectively, and which have the following hashes:
0000000000000000000d69a840ca2ad3560d596ccc4d2c26e7e56f4b5d18ec4e
0000000000000000003cd1f6db7b2e2009e975e3baac7fc8d1c1e53f8025b8d8
For the hash rates we collected the data underlying the
hash rate estimate chart2 from the 2-year period starting
from 23 Jan. 2017.
As we can see in Figure 2, the hash rate has changed
considerably over time — it tripled between Jan. 2018
1. https://www.blockchain.com/api/blockchain api
2. https://www.blockchain.com/charts/hash-rate
Figure 1: Bitcoin hash rate between January 2017 and
January 2019, smoothed using a 14-day moving average
filter (7 days on both sides).
and its peak around 18 Sept. 2018, and fell by roughly
1% per day in the 32 days from 6 Nov. to 7 Dec. The
observed average block creation time between 25 Jan.
2018 and 25 Jan. 2019 was not 600 seconds, but 581,
which reflects the fact for most of this one-year period,
the hash rate was increasing and the difficulty therefore
often too low. However, higher block creation times were
observed when the hash rate was dropping. In Figure 2,
the observed timestamp differences are compared to an
exponential distribution with a mean of 581 seconds: the
fit is generally good, but more low and high extremes
appear than one would expect from an exponential distri-
bution. The assumptions underlying our calculations will
be loosened to reflect this.
Since the largest observed drop in the hash rate trend
since early 2017 has been 1% per day, and the Bitcoin
difficulty resets every two weeks (or 16 days if we account
for the dropping hash rate), we will assume that at any
time the total network hash rate is at most 14-16% lower
than during the last difficulty rescale. Hence, we will
assume in the following that the time needed to create
k blocks can be conservatively assumed to be Erlang-
distributed with shape k and a mean of k · 12 minutes
(instead of k ·10 minutes).
5.2. Alert Types
Using the probabilistic model described above, we
introduce alerts that are triggered whenever the probability
of a given sequence of block creation times is below a
threshold. Different Bitcoin users require different levels
of reliability, and therefore different thresholds user’s typ-
ical transactions (see also [1]). A user who cares more
about fast confirmation times than security, e.g., an au-
tomated online store for video game downloads, might
accept a transaction if it appears on any main chain block,
with no confirmations needed. However, users with high
security expectations, e.g., financial service providers, are
more likely to use the six-confirmations rule, which means
that they will only accept a transaction if it appears in a
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number of observed blocks n
t (mins) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 12 18
20 1.9 ·10−1 5.0 ·10−1 7.7 ·10−1 9.1 ·10−1 9.7 ·10−1 9.9 ·10−1 ≈ 1 ≈ 1 ≈ 1 ≈ 1
40 3.6 ·10−2 1.5 ·10−1 3.5 ·10−1 5.7 ·10−1 7.6 ·10−1 8.8 ·10−1 9.5 ·10−1 9.8 ·10−1 ≈ 1 ≈ 1
60 6.7 ·10−3 4.0 ·10−2 1.2 ·10−1 2.7 ·10−1 4.4 ·10−1 6.2 ·10−1 7.6 ·10−1 8.7 ·10−1 ≈ 1 ≈ 1
80 1.3 ·10−3 9.8 ·10−3 3.8 ·10−2 1.0 ·10−1 2.1 ·10−1 3.5 ·10−1 5.0 ·10−1 6.5 ·10−1 9.8 ·10−1 ≈ 1
100 2.4 ·10−4 2.2 ·10−3 1.1 ·10−2 3.4 ·10−2 8.2 ·10−2 1.6 ·10−1 2.7 ·10−1 4.1 ·10−1 9.2 ·10−1 ≈ 1
120 4.5 ·10−5 5.0 ·10−4 2.8 ·10−3 1.0 ·10−2 2.9 ·10−2 6.7 ·10−2 1.3 ·10−1 2.2 ·10−1 7.9 ·10−1 9.9 ·10−1
140 8.6 ·10−6 1.1 ·10−4 6.9 ·10−4 3.0 ·10−3 9.6 ·10−3 2.5 ·10−2 5.5 ·10−2 1.1 ·10−1 6.1 ·10−1 9.7 ·10−1
160 1.6 ·10−6 2.3 ·10−5 1.7 ·10−4 8.1 ·10−4 2.9 ·10−3 8.6 ·10−3 2.1 ·10−2 4.5 ·10−2 4.3 ·10−1 9.2 ·10−1
180 3.1 ·10−7 4.9 ·10−6 3.9 ·10−5 2.1 ·10−4 8.6 ·10−4 2.8 ·10−3 7.6 ·10−3 1.8 ·10−2 2.7 ·10−1 8.2 ·10−1
240 2.1 ·10−9 4.3 ·10−8 4.6 ·10−7 3.2 ·10−6 1.7 ·10−5 7.2 ·10−5 2.6 ·10−4 7.8 ·10−4 3.9 ·10−2 3.8 ·10−1
300 1.4 ·10−11 3.6 ·10−10 4.7 ·10−9 4.1 ·10−8 2.7 ·10−7 1.4 ·10−6 6.1 ·10−6 2.3 ·10−5 3.1 ·10−3 9.2 ·10−2
360 9.4 ·10−14 2.9 ·10−12 4.5 ·10−11 4.7 ·10−10 3.6 ·10−9 2.3 ·10−8 1.2 ·10−7 5.2 ·10−7 1.7 ·10−4 1.3 ·10−2
480 4.2 ·10−18 1.7 ·10−16 3.6 ·10−15 4.9 ·10−14 5.0 ·10−13 4.1 ·10−12 2.8 ·10−11 1.7 ·10−10 2.1 ·10−7 8.0 ·10−5
600 1.9 ·10−22 9.8 ·10−21 2.5 ·10−19 4.3 ·10−18 5.4 ·10−17 5.6 ·10−16 4.7 ·10−15 3.5 ·10−14 1.3 ·10−10 1.8 ·10−7
Table 2: We display the probability of observing the creation of n or fewer blocks during the last t minutes, for different
values of n and k. To account for natural changes in the hash rate, we assume that the time between block creations is
12 minutes (instead of 10). The coloring is as described in Section 5.2.
Figure 2: Comparison between the observed timestamp
differences from 25 January 2018 to 25 January 2019
(with negative values removed) and the exponential dis-
tribution with the same mean as observed (581 seconds),
via a Q-Q plot. Better alignment between the circles and
the dashed line means a close fit. Despite the seemingly
good fit, many uncharacteristically low and high values
are observed, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the null hypothesis that the sample is drawn from the ex-
ponential distribution with a p-value of 4.565 ·10−7. This
is most likely due to considerable variations in the hash
rate during this period, as observed in Figure 1. Moreover,
the sample size is very large (namely > 50,000), which
means that even minor deviations from the exponential
distribution will result in a low p-value.
block that has six consecutive main chain blocks built on
top of it.
In Table 2, we have displayed for a range of combi-
nations of t and k, the probability of observing k blocks
during a time period of t minutes. These probabilities
were computed using the statistical package R.3 The
probabilities have been color-coded in the following way:
3. https://www.r-project.org/
a cell in Table 2 is colored yellow , orange , or red
if the corresponding probability is lower than 10−2,
10−4, or 10−6 respectively — the cell is colored green
if it neither. To compare this to certainty thresholds
that are common in the scientific literature: for hypothesis
testing in social science and clinical trials and threshold
of 5%, i.e., 5 · 10−2 is used, whereas the ‘five sigma’
rule used to mark a discovery in physics correspond to
2.87 · 10−7. Although the choice of thresholds for the
alert types is necessarily subjective, the yellow and red
flag thresholds were chosen to be roughly between these
values. Yellow flags might occur relatively even under
normal circumstances: since 144 blocks are mined per
day, an average 1.44 blocks per day will be have a creation
time that is in the top 1%. If the number of false alarms
is too high, then this by itself may be inconvenient to
the user — in any case, the exact alert level at which a
user is comfortable accepting a transaction depends on her
preferences.
In practice, we recommend the following scheme. We
aim to detect two types of eclipse attacks: 1) an attacker
without any significant mining power on her chain per-
forming a DoS attack, and 2) an attacker with significant
mining power who aims to double-spend. Regarding 1),
the lightweight client tracks how much time has passed
since the creation time (indicated by the timestamp) of the
last block. If this is longer than approximately 55, 110,
or 165 minutes, then this throws a yellow, orange, or red
flag, respectively (these values are derived directly from
the exponential distribution). For attack 2), we keep track
of the creation times of the last k+1 blocks, where k is the
number of confirmations. If k = 6, then this is longer than
approximately 190, 275, or 350 minutes, then this throws
a yellow, orange, or red flag, respectively (these values
are derived from the Erlang distribution). To summarize,
although one would normally except 7 blocks to be mined
after 70 minutes, one should get suspicious if it took three
hours, and if it took six hours one can say with near-
certainty that an attack is taking place.
Timestamp Reliability. We have so far assumed that the
timestamps are reliable: our analysis shows that under
normal circumstances this is a reasonable assumption,
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even though small deviations are tolerated by miners and
lightweight clients [38]. In 0.5% of all blocks observed
in the study period, the timestamp was lower than the
timestamp of the previous block, although these differ-
ences were often less than 30 seconds. These observations
were discarded to create Figure 2. Deviations may occur
because even honest miners have considerable freedom
when choosing the block timestamps. For example, the
miner could choose to fix the timestamp when she starts to
mine a new block, or update the timestamp continuously
while mining. If different miners follow different rules,
then this may lead to deviations from the exponential dis-
tribution. Furthermore, network latency adds a period of
time with an unclear probability distribution between the
creation of a block and the start of the mining process for
the next block. Still, our analysis of real block timestamps
suggests that these effects are negligible compared to the
roughly 10 minutes on average between block arrivals,
and that they do not have a major effect on the shape of
the tail (i.e., the likelihood that very large values occur).
During an attack, the attacker is also free to set the
timestamps at will. This has no effect if the attacker
is performing a DoS attack, because in that case the
attacker is not mining blocks. However, if she is trying to
double-spend, then she can choose the timestamps such
that the blocks appear to have been mined earlier. To
ameliorate this, the client can also consider the times at
which the blocks are first observed by the client instead
of the timestamps in the block headers. Let ∆ denote the
difference between the arrival time of the last block and
the client’s current system clock. The client can then add
∆ to the total time for the seven blocks – after all, this
is a lower bound on the last block’s contribution to the
total. Again, there are some concerns regarding the effect
of the network latency on the probability distribution of
the times between block arrivals. We leave the evaluation
of whether the exponential distribution is still a good fit
in this setting as future work.
5.3. Attack Analysis
In Table 3, we have displayed for several values of
α the probability that an α-strong is able to create 7
blocks without triggering an alert, for each of the four
alert types. We assume that the attacker controls at most
50% of the mining power, as otherwise it would be
easier to perform a 51% attack on the whole network
without eclipsing specific clients. We see that even for a
20%-strong attacker, the probability of creating 7 blocks
without of triggering a yellow alert is less than 1.7%. For
a 5%-strong attacker, the probability of not triggering a
red alert is already less than 0.01%. This means that an
attacker will need considerable mining power to perform
double-spend attacks without the risk of causing alarm,
even when simultaneously performing an eclipse attack.
6. Gossip-Based Protocol
In this section, Section 6.1 discuss the overview of
the gossip-based protocol, Section 6.2 give protocol de-
scription of passive-based gossiping approach and Sec-
tion 6.3 provides a detailed analysis of its effectiveness.
Last, Section 6.4 shortly discuss an active-based gossiping
α yellow orange red
0.05 2.05 ·10−6 2.72 ·10−5 1.40 ·10−4
0.08 5.78 ·10−5 6.40 ·10−4 2.82 ·10−3
0.125 1.10 ·10−3 9.34 ·10−3 3.28 ·10−2
0.2 1.68 ·10−2 9.44 ·10−2 2.33 ·10−1
0.3 1.13 ·10−1 3.85 ·10−1 6.46 ·10−1
0.5 5.47 ·10−1 8.85 ·10−1 9.77 ·10−1
Table 3: We display the probability that an α-strong
attacker is able to create 7 blocks within a period that
is short enough to not trigger an alert, for each of the 3
alert types.
approach which helps to further improve detection time.
The notation used to describe our gossip-based protocol
is presented in Table 4.
Notation Description
S a server participating in the protocol
LC a (light) client participating in the protocol
VLC a blockchain view of LC
VS a blockchain view of S
HDRS−>LC a set of block headers send from S to LC
HDRLC−>S a set of block headers send from LC to S
Table 4: Summary of the used notations.
6.1. Protocol Overview
Bitcoin is a trustless, decentralized network and our
approach for detecting eclipse attacks follows these core
principles. The proposed protocol does not implicitly need
to trust any one server in the gossip network. Rather, it
assumes that if a client can connect to at least one server
with a legitimate view of the blockchain, then a potential
eclipse attack can be detected. In our approach client-
server connections are driven by the user’s natural Internet
traffic. For every such connection, a client piggybacks its
blockchain view to the server, which in turn returns its
strongest view. Afterwards, the communicating parties can
update their views according to the strongest chain rule. In
such an approach, servers are passive and not connected
to the Bitcoin network, but they maintain their strongest
blockchain views based on the input from clients.
To illustrate the process better, we depict the main
elements and intuitions behind our framework in Figure 3.
Let us consider the selected case where there are three
servers and three clients supporting our scheme. Clients
LC1 and LC2 are connected to the genuine Bitcoin network
BN1 with the BC1 blockchain view (i.e., headers), while
the client LC3 is under an eclipse attack and connected
to the malicious BN2 with the view BC2. The agents
communicate in the following sequence:
1) The clients LC1 and LC2 holding genuine
blockchain views contact the server S1, which
after their connections validates and accepts the
received (authentic) view.
2) LC3 is eclipsed and connected to a malicious Bit-
coin network partition BN2, and while connecting
to the server S3 (without any current view), the
malicious view is accepted by the server.
3) Afterwards, the attacked client LC3 connects to
the server S2. The server and client exchange their
blockchain views.
7
Figure 3: Proposed eclipse attack detection model com-
prising of servers, light clients, the Bitcoin network, and
the attacker. Blocks/headers that are colored red were
created by the attacker.
4) The server S2 stores the received headers from
the client LC3. It validates the view received from
LC3 and picks the chain that corresponds to the
strongest view (which is expected to be part of
the canonical blockchain). The server sends its
(strongest) view to the client.
5) LC3 is now able to detect that it is under an
eclipse attack just by concluding that there exists
a stronger blockchain than the one obtained from
the malicious partition.
We emphasize that in passive mode gossiping, the
detection process is driven by natural Internet traffic as
participating servers are assumed to already exist (e.g.,
running web services), and the protocol messages are
piggybacked on the standard client-server connections. In
the case of active mode gossiping, we assume that clients
make explicit connections with known servers to compare
their view of the blockchain with that of the servers before
when they check their wallet.
6.2. The Passive Gossip-Based Protocol
In Section 5, we saw that based on timestamps alone,
a user can at best get suspicious after an hour and be
almost certain of an attack after roughly three hours. If
the attacker controls some mining power on her branch,
then attack detection is even slower. In this section, we
propose a gossip-based protocol to detect eclipse attacks
more rapidly. It is described as a series of interactions
between the server, lightweight client, and the Bitcoin
network. The client−server communication is part of the
natural client’s traffic whereas the client−Bitcoin network
communication is on demand, like today. The main goal
of the client−server communication is to provide a client,
via a server, with the strongest view of the chain the
server has seen. To achieve this, a lightweight client
forwards to a contacted server headers obtained from
the Bitcoin network. When a server communicates with
multiple clients, the server stores the strongest view of the
chain it has received and serves this view to connecting
clients. As a result, a client viewing a malicious partition
of the Bitcoin network is able to fetch the strongest chain
seen by the server and compare with its own. When the
server has a stronger view of the chain, the client can
conclude that it is under an eclipse attack. In addition
to detecting eclipse attacks, we propose a Bitcoin header
size optimization to reduce communication overheads. We
choose the headers of HTTP(S) request/response messages
as a communication medium of our gossip layer due to
the ubiquitous nature of HTTP(S). Furthermore, if HTTPS
is used then the message headers are encrypted, which
means that a man-in-the-middle attacker cannot distin-
guish these messages from normal traffic. We discuss the
implications of our choice in Section 6.2.5. We focus on
the passive version of the protocol in this section, and
shortly discuss the active version in Section 6.4.
Storage Requirement. The storage on the client and
the server is a fixed-length sequence of Bitcoin headers,
referred to as a queue or window. New headers enter at
the tail of the queue and old headers exit at the head. The
client and server windows are of equal size. As we explain
later, the maximum storage requirement on a client/server
is 2016 times 80 bytes, i.e., around 160 kB and we can
also compress it as mention in Section 6.2.4 to reduce
storage requirement by half. Here, 2016 corresponds to
the average number of Bitcoin blocks generated in two
weeks and 80 bytes is the Bitcoin header size.
Network Interactions. The main agents of our protocol
are the server(s), client(s), and the Bitcoin network. A
client may have newly joined, or been offline for a period
of time. The first step for the client is to get its headers
up-to-date from the Bitcoin network. It may, however,
get updated with malicious headers when it is under an
eclipse attack. The second step is the exchange of head-
ers between the client and a protocol-running server via
HTTP(S) messages. However, a server that starts to deploy
our protocol may have an empty window and no headers
to send. If this is the case, it accepts the headers provided
by the client and returns an empty (NULL) window to
the client. The message exchange that follows is discussed
in Section 6.2.1. The third step is to match the views on
the client and server. This is discussed in Section 6.2.2.
The final step is to find the strongest chain, as we discuss
in Section 6.2.3. Section 6.2.4 presents an optimization
technique for the block headers to save both storage and
bandwidth. Section 6.2.5 discusses the choice of layer
used for message exchange.
6.2.1. Message Exchange Between Client and Server.
In the following, we assume that a client has a copy of
the headers from the Bitcoin network, but is unable to
ascertain whether they belong to an inferior chain created
by an attacker. Hence, the client wishes to connect to a
server or group of servers and confirm the veracity of the
headers it received via its natural HTTP(s) connections.
The message exchange between the client and a server
begins with a service request from the client.
Figure 4 outlines the message exchange between the
client and the server. We note that the header index of
the genesis block is 0 and we define last as the index
of the latest header. This would ensure that both chains
are compared over the same index range avoiding offset
calculation mistakes (please note that Bitcoin headers do
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not contain any sequence numbers). Let range= [beg,end]
be the sequence of blocks between a given beginning and
ending index, respectively. The messages exchanged are
i) a request for headers in a range or ii) a set of headers.
The gossip message created by the client is a range
of headers and is communicated to the server which
handles the gossip message received. The set of requested
headers (HDRS−>LC) and a new range are sent to the
client, who responds to the server with the requested
headers (HDRLC−>S). The client and the server have now
completed their exchange of headers.
Algorithm 1: Find strongest chain given 2 views
input : VLC,VS; VLC 6= VS
output: strongestChain
1 function findStrongestChain (VLC,VS)
2 strongestChain← {} ;
3 sWeight← 0, cWeight← 0 ;
4 foreach b ∈ VLC do
5 targetHash← f ind target(b) ;
6 cWeight← cWeight+ targetHash ;
7 end
8 foreach b ∈ VS do
9 targetHash← f ind target(b) ;
10 sWeight← sWeight+ targetHash ;
11 end
12 if cWeight > sWeight then
13 strongestChain← VS;
14 end
15 else if cWeight < sWeight then
16 strongestChain← VLC;
17 end
18 return strongestChain;
6.2.2. View Matching. Once the messages have been
exchanged, the next step is to compare them. How-
ever, it needs to be ensured that comparisons are over
Figure 4: Header exchange between client and server.
the same range of headers. To achieve this goal, we
formalize the view on the server and the client. The
server view is its window of the latest headers: VS =
{bn+1,...,bn+k}. The client view is VLC = {bˆn+1,...,bˆn+k}.
Note that the server and client exclude headers received
from their most recent message exchange. Hence, we
have, VS← VS \b;{b : b ∈ HDRLC−>S,b /∈VS} and VLC←
VLC \b;{b : b ∈ HDRS−>LC,b /∈VLC}. The excluded head-
ers from their current view are added after the strongest
chain is computed (see Section 6.2.3). This ensures that
comparisons are not made on the same copy of headers
exchanged from one side to the other.
When no forks are detected, the server and the client
are viewing the same set of headers and b=bˆ. When a
fork is detected at b∗∈ VS, VLC; the subsequent b6=bˆ.
Here, the server and client are viewing the same set of
header up to b∗, and the subsequent views diverge. The
fork is resolved by following the Bitcoin’s strongest chain
applied to views. All message exchanges in a window
of size k, are bounded to 2∗k header transfers, for one
round of client−server communication. The ability of the
client to detect and resolve a fork is limited to forks
occurring within the window. For instance, a window
size of k = 2016 corresponds to roughly 2 weeks (for an
average inter-block time of 10 minutes) and a client who
is offline for this period is still able to detect a fork. The
size of the window is a system parameter and may be
increased to support a longer detection period.
6.2.3. Finding the Strongest Chain. Once the views
are matched, the client and server are ready to find the
strongest chain. By the nature of the message exchange,
clients and servers may see different views of the chain
over a period of time (within the same range). When
presented with two views, they pick the stronger chain as
specified by the Bitcoin protocol (note that any stronger
chain presented can convince an attacked client that she
is under the attack). This process is repeated for every
round of a message exchange and the full algorithm is
described in Algorithm 1, taking the views VS and VLC
as input and outputting the strongest chain. Lines 4-7
and 8-11 calculate the cumulative sum of the proof-of-
work of the headers in VLC and VS respectively (which
is derived from nBits [10] for each header). Lines 12-17
compare the cumulative sum to decide on the strongest
chain. Recall that for a smaller target hash, a higher hash
rate is required to solve a proof-of-work puzzle. As a
result, the smaller cumulative sum determines which view
is stronger. Once the strongest chain is determined at the
server, all {b : b ∈ HDRLC−>S,b /∈VS} that can form a
valid chain are added to VS. Similarly, at the client, all
valid {b : b ∈ HDRS−>LC,b /∈VLC} are added to VLC. Note
that the window is implemented as a fixed-length FIFO
queue. The last step of extending the view is to prepare
the protocol for the next round of communication. Headers
are not checked if they are part of the strongest chain seen
yet.
6.2.4. Header Size Reduction. As our protocol requires
that blockchain fragments (i.e., consecutive block head-
ers) are sent between clients and servers, we propose
a way of minimizing this overhead. The main intuition
behind our modification is that the prevHash field of
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the Bitcoin header can be computed from the previous
header. Therefore, for a subchain consisting of consecutive
block headers, only the first header has to include its
prevHash, whereas every subsequent header can compute
it recursively. Another observation is that some header
fields have either constant or infrequently changing values.
Figure 5: Header size reduced by removing version, nBits
and prevHash fields.
In Figure 5, we present a header list where the
full header is only stored in bi, whereas bi+1 and bi+2
have their highlighted fields removed. While each Bitcoin
header is 80 bytes in size, it is unnecessary to store all
fields as nBits is fixed for 2015 consecutive blocks, version
changes infrequently, and prevHash can be recalculated
as described above. Hence, in our protocol we remove
nBits (we send it only for difficulty changes – every 2016
blocks), version (we send it only for version changes),
and prevHash fields from most headers that are part of
the message exchange. These changes help us to reduce
the size of a typical header from 80 to only 40 bytes.
6.2.5. Gossip Layer. As mentioned before, we have im-
plemented our protocol by appending the block headers
to the header of an HTTP request-response. This facili-
tates the easier deployment of our protocol as no higher-
level protocol modifications are required. Also appending
additional data into the HTTP header does not break
applications not supporting our protocol since server drops
any unnecessary data in the header without affecting the
protocol. Though HTTP protocol specification does not
specify any limit on the amount of data that can be sent
in a HTTP headers, web servers usually restrict the size to
4k-64k. However, this limit is configurable and can be set
according to the requirement of our protocol. Although
selecting HTTP as gossiping medium make our protocol
application specific means exclude non-HTTP(S) traffic
that can also be leveraged to gossip, we have found that
in practice, HTTP(S) dominates Internet traffic. In fact,
non-HTTP(S) traffic only accounts for 12% of Internet
traffic in our dataset. This is discussed in more detail
in Section 6.3. We note that different choices for the
gossip layer could be made, e.g., the HTTP(S) body could
be modified instead, or TCP headers could be used to
capture a broader category of traffic. However, TCP header
modification could have unforeseen effects on middleware
that would undo any advantages. For completeness, we
present implementations of gossip medium with TCP
in Section A to make our scheme application-agnostic and
HTTP body in Section B.
6.3. Analysis of the Passive Gossip Protocol
In this section, we analyze real Internet traffic trace to
demonstrate that our approach of passive mode gossiping
is practical and efficient compared to the timestamp-based
protocol of Section 5. In fact, a user may be able to detect
with certainty that she is under attack in roughly one hour
compared to 3 hours previously. We first discuss the data
in Section 6.3.1. We discuss our exact evaluation metrics
— coverage of client IPs, speed of attack detection, and
server freshness — in Section 6.3.2. We evaluate these
metrics using the data in Section 6.3.3.
6.3.1. Description of Data. To understand the Internet
access pattern of users we analyze the traffic log from a
university firewall4. The users authenticate to the firewall
before they access the Internet. This allows us to obtain
access details of their devices to public IP addresses from
the firewall traffic log. As the user devices are assigned
IPs through DHCP, we identify users by their user name
rather than their DHCP-assigned IP address5. In some
cases, users access public servers within the university
network through a private IP, hence we also include those
IP addresses to analyse our protocol. In order to include
only traffic in which we can gossip (via HTTP(S) message
bodies), we make use of the port field in the traffic log.
We also consider connections which were blocked by the
firewall, since we assume that these connections would
have succeeded outside the university.
In total, we collected 72 hours of continuous firewall
traffic log. This included 229,374 unique client IPs (as-
signed using DHCP) and 269,069 accessed server IPs.
However, these client IPs were mapped to 2511 users and
we selected 43277 server IPs that were active in at least
4 out of 12 epochs (the total 72-hour time period was
divided into 12 epochs). In order to understand the user
activity, every 24 hours (representing a day) was divided
into 15-minute slots. The average number of connections
for each slot across the 72 hrs of traffic log is represented
in Figure 6. We can see that user activity is high during
certain time intervals (active periods) and less so during
other time intervals (inactive periods) — we assume that
many users are sleeping during the inactive period. Later,
we explain how these inactive periods influence our re-
sults.
Ethical Consideration. The traffic log was provided to
carry out research without breaching any user privacy pol-
icy. We obtained the following details: timestamp, server
IP, client IP, action and a unique string representing the
user’s ID. No other details regarding the users were used
for analysis. We do not publish the dataset with this paper,
and as such its use constitutes minimal risk to the users.
6.3.2. Methodology. Given the full dataset, let U be the
full set of users, and S the full set of server IPs observed.
Furthermore, let t0 and tmax be the times of the first and
last connections respectively, and T = [t0, tmax]. We can
then extract from the dataset the full set C of connections,
where each connection c ∈ C is a tuple (uc,sc, tc), such
that
4. We do not disclose the university name to comply with the double-
blind review process.
5. In accessible traffic datasets, users are not identifiable. Hence, it is
necessary to assume the user:IP mapping. Our dataset allows to associate
users with connections, to improve the accuracy of our study and to make
it realistic.
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Figure 6: The traffic logs of 24hrs are divided into 15
minutes time-slots and average of total traffic in each slot
across the 72hrs traffic log is represented in the graph.
• uc ∈ U is the ID of the user who initiates the
connection,
• sc ∈S is the IP address of the server, and
• tc ∈T is the initiation time of the connection.
We then use C to define the following metrics for the
performance of the gossip-based approach:
Coverage: given a set S⊂S of servers, we define its
coverage as the fraction of unique users that at some point
connect to a server in S. This can be formally expressed
as
Coverage(S) =
|{u ∈U : ∃c ∈ C such that su ∈ S}|
|U | ,
where |A| denotes the number of elements in set A.
Attack Detection Speed: given a user u ∈ U and a
set S⊂S of servers, we define the attack detection speed
as the time until the next connection from u to a server
in S. To make this formal, we first define Cu,S as the set
of all connections to S initiated by u, i.e.,
Cu,S = {c ∈ C : uc = u and sc ∈ S}.
For any t ∈ T , let Tu,S(t) be the set of all time points
after t at which u connects to a server in S. That is,
Tu,S(t) = {t ′ ∈T : ∃c∈Cu,S such that tu = t ′ and tu > t}.
We then define δu,S(t) as the time from t ∈ T until u’s
next connection to a server in S (or until tmax). That is,
δu,S(t) =
{
min(Tu,S(t))− t if Tu,S(t) 6= /0,
tmax− t otherwise.
(Note that Tu,S(t) 6= /0 only for t after the time of the last
connection, at which point we consider a connection to
occur exactly at the end of the observation period.) We
will assume that attacks occur at a time that is drawn
uniformly from T . The Average Attack Detection Time
(AADT) for u to S is then given as follows:
AADT(u,S) =
1
tmax− t0
∫
T
δu,S(t)dt (1)
The reasoning behind (1) is as follows. Let the time at
which the attack occurs be given by the random variable
δu,S(t)
tt0 tmax
Figure 7: Graphical illustration of the average attack
detection times given a user u and a set of servers S.
Connections from u to a server in S occur at the time
points indicated by the vertical red bars. The dotted lines
represent δu,S(t) — the time of the next connection after
t.
T ∗, and its probability density function by fT ∗(t) : T →
[0,∞). It then holds6 that
E(δu,S(T ∗)) =
∫
T
δu,S(t) fT ∗(t)dt, (2)
where E denotes the expected value of a random variable.
Substituting 1tmax−t0 for fT ∗(t) (which follows from the
uniform distribution of the attack times) into (2) then leads
to (1).
A graphical representation of the AADT is given
in Figure 7. In this example, the connections occur at
the locations of the vertical red bars, and the height of
the red bar indicates the amount of time until the next
connection. The function δu,S is represented by the dotted
lines, and the area of the blue triangles represents the
integral in Equation 1.
Server Freshness: given a server s ∈ S and a set
U ⊂U of users, we define the freshness as the time since
the previous connection from a user in U to s. It can
defined in a similar way as the attack detection time. That
is, let T ′s,U (t) be defined as the set of all time points before
t at which a user in U connects to s. Then ηs,U (t) is the
amount of time since the last connection by a user in U
to s, defined as follows:
ηs,U (t) =
{
t−max
(
T ′s,U (t)
)
if T ′s,U (t) 6= /0,
t− tmin otherwise.
The average server freshness can then be defined as fol-
lows:
Freshness(s,U) =
1
tmax− t0
∫
T
ηs,U (t)dt (3)
A graphical representation of ηs,U (t) would look similar
to Figure 7, but with the triangles flipped horizontally.
Active/Inactive Periods. As can be seen from the Fig-
ure 7, long periods of inactivity — represented by the
three large triangles — have a considerable impact on the
AADT. One typical period of inactivity is the period be-
tween 2:00AM and 7:30AM (see also Figure 6), although
longer periods (where users are offline for at least a day)
are also regularly observed in the dataset. To mitigate this,
we propose the following feature: if a user’s view has
6. See, e.g.,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/law of the unconscious
statistician
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not been updated for over eight hours, then an alert is
triggered. This is incorporated in the computation of the
AADT by removing all time periods that correspond to at
least eight hours of inactivity.
Stratified Sampling. In the following, we will also divide
the servers into several tiers: tier 1 contains servers with
1601-3200 unique users access, tier 2 those with 801-
1600 access, up to tier 6 with less than 100 access. If
we choose a random sample S of servers, the tiers that
the chosen servers belong have a strong impact on our
results — e.g., if all the servers are drawn from tiers 5-6
then the coverage will be poor, whereas even one server
from tier 1 would improve the results dramatically. Hence,
in Section 6.3.3 we will use a stratified sampling method
that ensures that our sample contains servers from each
of tiers 1-4.
6.3.3. Results. The tables for the empirical results for
the coverage, AADT, and average server freshness in
Tables Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 respectively. In all of
our experiments, we group the servers in our dataset into
five groups such that servers in each group either belong to
the same organization or within a specific IP range. This
is only a way of selecting the servers to run our protocol
to show the effectiveness, there is no strict rule on which
servers can adopt our protocol. Any public server offering
a service to the users can help with gossiping, more the
number of servers the faster the attack detection.
tier 1 tiers 1-4
Groups ns Coverage ns Coverage
Group 1 107 0.996 731 0.996
Group 2 23 0.99 399 0.991
Group 3 32 0.981 1642 0.99
Group 4 9 0.982 42 0.982
Group 5 10 0.93 64 0.953
Table 5: Results for the coverage (in hours) for the servers
of different five different groups.
In Table 5, we display the coverage results for the five
groups.
tier 1 tiers 1-4
Groups ns AADT ns AADT
Group 1 107 0.793 731 0.788
Group 2 23 0.862 399 0.843
Group 3 32 1.011 1642 0.868
Group 4 9 0.944 42 0.929
Group 5 10 1.122 64 1.13
Table 6: Results for the AADT (in hours) for the servers
to five different groups.
In Table 6, we display the results for the AADT during
the active periods, averaged across all 2511 users. We see
that in each case, the average time to detect is around
one hour. This can be achieved by just a handful of
popular servers, e.g., Group 4’s 9 or Group 5’s 10 most
popular servers. In most cases, the lower-tier servers do
not contribute much to performance — the exception is
Group 3, which has a very large number of lower-tier
servers, which is probably due the servers being part of a
large cloud service provider.
pu nu tier 1 tiers 1-4
0.01 25 0.801 ± 0.0619 1.716 ± 0.0566
0.03 75 0.492 ± 0.0478 1.553 ± 0.0426
0.1 251 0.264 ± 0.017 1.137 ± 0.0282
0.3 753 0.155 ± 0.0045 0.863 ± 0.014
1.0 2511 0.109 ± 0.0 0.591 ± 0.0
Table 7: 95%-confidence intervals for the average server
freshness (in hours) for different user adoption percent-
ages pu. We use random sampling with 8 experiments.
In Table 7, we have displayed the results for the server
freshness. We considered different user adoption rates,
ranging from 1% to 100%. For each of the given percent-
ages, we draw a random sample among the users, and
repeat this experiment 8 times to create 95% confidence
interval for each entry. We see that even 25 active users
can maintain an average server freshness of below one
hour. Note that by a 100% adoption rate we just refer
to the users in this dataset, and that for a real highest-
tier Group 4 & 5 (servers in this group mainly offers so-
cial networking services.) servers, 2500 active lightweight
client users may not be unrealistic.
6.4. The Active Gossip-Based Protocol
We have seen that the passive mode gossip protocol
reduces average attack times from three hours to around
one hour. To improve this even further, the active mode
gossip protocol initiates connections to known protocol-
running servers before certain events. One typical event
is a user checking her wallet balance using the client –
since, she is at the risk of making erroneous decisions
if her client is being eclipsed as part of a double-spend
attack. To obtain knowledge of protocol-running servers,
the client builds a list of servers while it does passive
gossiping. That is, if the server is able to interpret the
additional range field in the HTTP(S) request and send
back the requested block headers within that range in the
corresponding HTTP(S) response, then client in addition
to running our protocol (passive) add the IP address of
the server to the list, if previously unknown. After a
triggering event, a random selection of the known servers
are polled from this list – the size of this selection depends
on the client, as more servers means a better chance
of detection, but more additional traffic. If an up-to-date
server is contacted, then eclipse attack detection is almost
instantaneous during periods of interest.
In some cases, e.g., if the server is hosting
a website associated with a block explorer (e.g.,
blockchain.com) or a cryptocurrency exchange (e.g.,
binance.com), then the company that runs the server
is likely to run its own full node anyway, which makes a
link even more natural.
7. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the real-world implementa-
tion of our approach. As the deployment of the timestamp-
based approach is straightforward (see Section 5), we limit
this discussion to the gossip protocol.
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7.1. Real-World Deployment
In contrast to competing techniques [14], one of our
design goals is to not require any additional infrastructure.
The gossip protocol works in a distributed way, as anyone
can join the network by launching a supporting server.
The dataset used for the analysis mainly consist of traffic
towards web service providers whom we assumed to be
willing to deploy our gossip protocol on their servers.
We then evaluated the time required for a typical Internet
user to detect an eclipse attack (analyzed based on our
network traffic data). We selected the most popular (by
user interactions) Internet servers to model the typical
pattern of connections between a user and a service.
However, in practice, it is difficult to determine which
servers or organizations would be willing to support the
protocol, and we see this as a limitation of our analysis.
Finally, we note that although we considered adoption
by specific set of servers categorized into five groups for
our analysis, we do not introduce any centralization factors
with it since any number of different entities can run our
protocol simultaneously and independently.
7.2. Privacy
Our protocol is privacy-friendly since lightweight
clients gossip only block headers and do not execute any
payment verification with the gossip servers. Hence, nei-
ther Bitcoin wallet addresses nor transaction information
is conveyed to the server. Although lightweight clients
reveal to the server their public IP and the fact that they
use Bitcoin, it is not straightforward for an adversarial
server to map the IP to any specific Bitcoin address or
transaction. It would be possible to do so by running Sybil
nodes in the Bitcoin network itself [18], [16], [17], but
such a threat is orthogonal to our protocol.
8. Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented our gossip-based protocol using the
Python-Flask web framework [12]. The client side uses
the Python Requests library that enables it to send custom
HTTP request to servers with modified HTTP headers. We
use Flask’s default web server to run the web application
that supports our gossip-based protocol. At the server,
block headers are buffered in its memory for faster access
– however, we leave performance optimization as future
work. In order to send the block headers which are stored
as bytes, we use Base64 encoding to convert the bytes to
strings before appending them to the HTTP header.
Evaluation
We have built a custom testbed on Amazon AWS and
then used it to evaluate our gossip-layer implementation.
We conducted a series of experiments, picking a pair
of virtual machine instances (t2.micro) running Linux
Ubuntu 18.04 in two different cities across different con-
tinents, such that one acts as a web server and the other
as a client.
To evaluate the latency inflation introduced by gossip
messages, we measured the time for a HTTP request-
response to complete in two different scenarios, case 1) a
Servers
C
lie
nt
s
OH SG FR SY
OH 0.15% 0.12% 0.12%
(1.13ms) (0.49ms) (0.86ms)
SG 0.11% 0.11% 0.04%
(0.96ms) (0.69ms) (0.26ms)
FR 0.28% 0.05% 0.06%
(1.06ms) (0.29ms) (0.65ms)
SY 0.09% 0.23% 0.11%
(0.72ms) (1.66ms) (1.22ms)
Table 8: The average percentage latency inflation with
our enhancement when 72 block headers (12 hrs) are
transferred.
normal HTTP request-response, case 2) A HTTP request-
response with an additional payloads of 72 block headers
(12 hrs) in the HTTP header. The time taken for each
case was measured and repeated for 100 such HTTP
request-response. The difference in time between the two
cases is the introduced latency measured. The experiment
was redone across different cities. The cities chosen are
Ohio (OH), Singapore (SG), Frankfurt (FR), and Sydney
(SY). Table 8 presents the average latency overhead while
the client gossip 72 (12 hrs) of its block headers. The row
and column are the locations of the client and the server
respectively. The results show that the average latency
inflation is just 0.12% which is negligible.
9. Conclusions
In this work, we have presented two lightweight proto-
cols for the detection of eclipse attacks on Bitcoin clients.
Our schemes either use block timestamps, or existing
web servers to create an out-of-Bitcoin gossiping network
basing on natural Internet traffic. We do not require any
changes to the Bitcoin protocol or its network. More-
over, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol
by conducting a series of simulations using real Internet
client-server communication traces and show that it is
very efficient. We implemented the scheme by extending
a web application to gossip block headers in its HTTP(S)
header. We proposed a method for compressing Bitcoin
subchains and evaluated our implementation with multiple
experiments. Our analysis and evaluation indicate that
the protocol provides multiple benefits, while introduc-
ing low overheads and a significantly improved detection
time. Although our system was designed for Bitcoin, it
can be directly applicable to Bitcoin forks and similar
strongest-chain proof-of-work blockchains. Furthermore,
we envision that the protocol can be extended to other
classes of blockchain systems, like proof-of-stake schemes
or permissioned blockchains, however we leave this as
future work.
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Appendix A.
TCP Gossip Layer
Another design choice of our architecture is implement
the message exchange of our protocol as an extension of
the transport layer, more specifically the TCP protocol.
TCP is the de facto standard transport protocol of the
Internet, ubiquitously used and implemented by a large
number of existing protocols, devices, and operating sys-
tems. Therefore, any system running a modified TCP stack
with the ability to store and process gossip messages is
able to use the proposed protocol. Another advantage of
using TCP as a gossip layer is its requires no changes
to existing applications unlike our present implementation
with HTTP. For these reasons, the adoption of our protocol
could be accelerated and our protocol could perform better
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Figure 8: Our protocol implemented by extending a 3-
way-TCP handshake between a client and server. Option 1
is used when all data requests fits in a 3-Way-Handshake.
Option 2 is used to exchange additional data packets.
in eclipse attack detection (as the protocol can be executed
seamlessly between a large number of clients and servers).
More concretely, to minimize the latency inflation
caused by sending Bitcoin headers, we implement our
message exchange as data piggybacked on the TCP hand-
shake. We leverage the fact that the TCP handshake
consists of three messages that do not carry data.7Hence,
we minimize introduced latency by exchanging block
headers via TCP handshake messages (sent anyway while
establishing a TCP connection).
As seen in Figure 8, a client initiates a TCP handshake
with a server and two options are supported. In option 1,
the requested block headers are fully exchanged within
a 3-way TCP handshake. However, limitations to the
number of block headers that can fit into a TCP packet
implies that further communication may be needed to
send any outstanding block headers. In this case, our
protocol introduces latency inflation and this scenario is
illustrated as option 2. The client and server are seen
to have additional block headers delivered in the data
exchange that follows. Usually, each TCP packet is limited
to 1500 bytes.8 This approximately corresponds to 35
reduced-size block headers (each 40 bytes) that can be
communicated in a single packet of the TCP handshake.
Therefore, with a TCP handshake only (i.e., SY N, SY N-
ACK, and ACK), the server can receive up to 70 headers
from the client and the client can receive up to 35 headers
from the server, which is near to 12 and 6 hours of block
header data respectively (with an average 10 minute inter-
block delay).
7. Carrying data on TCP handshake packets is allowed by the TCP
specification, although such data is not passed to applications. It does not
influence our protocol as it is implemented at the TCP (not application)
layer.
8. 1500 bytes is the standard Internet MTU [2].
Implementation
To implement our protocol we extended an exist-
ing TCP stack. The gossip layer is implemented on
Lightweight IP (LwIP) [23], a state-of-the-art userspace
TCP implementation used in production by many systems.
With our implementation, the server and client run a mod-
ified TCP stack to communicate on the network through a
TAP/TUN interface [4]. The TCP three-way handshake is
initiated by calling tcp_connect() which in turn calls
tcp_enqueue_flags(), to build the packets with
the required TCP flags. We modified this API to allow
piggybacking our gossiping messages on TCP handshake
packets. The following code snippet gives an overview
of the modified tcp_enqueue_flags() function that
caters for gossip messaging.
tcp_enqueue_flags(pcb, flags,
gossipMsg){
gossip_len = sizeof(gossipMsg)
packet = pbuf_alloc(PBUF_TRANSPORT,
optlen + gossip_len,
PBUF_RAM))
TCP_DATA_COPY2(packet->payload +
optlen, gossipMsg)
seg = tcp_create_segment(pcb,
packet, flags,
pcb->snd_lbb,
optflags))
}
The tcp_enqueue_flags() function takes three
arguments, namely: protocol control block (pcb), TCP
flags, and a gossip message of our protocol. The
pbuf_alloc() function is responsible for memory al-
location and in our case we have to adjust the parameters
of this functions such that an additional memory for the
gossip message is allocated. The TCP_DATA_COPY2()
function is a variant of a memory copy function used
to copy the gossip message onto the packet. The
tcp_create_segment() function creates a TCP seg-
ment, with the required gossip message. At the receiving
end, TCP segments are handled by the tcp_input()
function.
tcp_input(tcp_segment){
removeHeaders(tcp_segment->payload)
MEMCPY(buffer, tcp_segment->payload,
tcp_segment->length)
}
With this call, the packet header in
tcp_segment->payload is removed and the
received gossip message (block headers) is left. It
is copied to the buffer for further processing of
our protocol. We implemented a simple file transfer
(client-server) application using our modified stack.
Evaluation
The setup is similar to Section 8,
In this case also, we measured the time for a TCP con-
nection establishment in two different scenarios, case 1)
A normal TCP handshake, case 2) A TCP handshake with
an additional payload of 1440 bytes (including 35 block
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OH SG FR SY
OH 2.26% 2.39% 1.22%
(2.22ms) (2.33ms) (2.35ms)
SG 1.09% 1.47% 1.32%
(2.39ms) (2.52ms) (2.31ms)
FR 2.36% 1.28% 0
(2.30ms) (2.22ms)
SY 1.23% 1.32% 0
(2.37ms) (2.22ms)
Table 9: The average percentage latency inflation with our
enhancement.
headers). The time taken for each case was measured and
repeated for 100 such TCP handshakes. The difference
in time between the two cases is the introduced latency
measured. The experiment was redone across different
cities. Table 9 presents the average latency overhead. On
an average, the overhead is seen to be close to 1.59%. For
handshakes between Frankfurt and Sydney, no overhead
was recorded and may be attributed to high network
latency.
Appendix B.
HTTP body Gossip-Layer
In this section we present the results for evaluation
of our gossiping using HTTP body. Unlike sending data
in HTTP headers of request-response message. Here, we
provide an implementation based on sending the block
headers as file chunks in HTTP body with 72 (12 hrs),
144 (24 hrs), 1008 (7 days) and 2016 (14 days) block
headers. The results are presented in tables Table 12, Ta-
ble 13, Table 10, and Table 11 respectively. The experi-
mental setup and evaluation methodology is exactly same
as in Section 8.
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OH SG FR SY
OH 149.56% 148.77% 152.82%
(1338.74ms) (1162.44ms) (579.62ms)
SG 149.94% 143.03% 153.66%
(1341.85ms) (982.34ms) (1106.01ms)
FR 149.09% 163.08% 152.02%
(581.06s) (1094.42ms) (1740.01ms)
SY 150.14% 176.30% 150.78%
(1142.51ms) (1269.78ms) (1724.61ms)
Table 10: The average percentage latency inflation with
our enhancement when 2016 block headers (14 days) are
transferred.
As we can see the latency inflation is almost on an
average 100% for block headers generated over a week
and increases by 50-60% for two weeks. In case of 12
hrs i.e. 72 block headers the average latency inflation
is 0.08% and increase with 24 hrs block headers. The
results indicate that the inflation remains negligible if the
users come online for at least once in a day which is not
unrealistic with the present day Internet users.
In Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the average latency
for HTTP request-response for clients with our enhance
while they are placed at OH, SG, FR and SY. The results
prove that the latency only grows linearly with increase
in number of block headers.
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OH SG FR SY
OH 99.63% 99.32% 128.35%
(891.71ms) (386.94ms) (976.29ms)
SG 99.58% 99.02% 100.68%
(0.19ms) (0.53ms) (1.46ms)
FR 99.31% 100.72% 99.87%
(387.01ms) (675.87ms) (1143.12ms)
SY 99.57% 100.38% 99.76%
(757.62ms) (722.98ms) (1141.07ms)
Table 11: The average percentage latency inflation with
our enhancement when 1008 block headers (7 days) are
transferred.
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OH SG FR SY
OH 0.04% 0.21% 0.03%
(0.27ms) (0.79ms) (0.21ms)
SG 0.10% 0.04% 0.06%
(0.89ms) (0.41ms) (0.41ms)
FR 0.20% 0.02% 0.04%
(0.80ms) (0.11ms) (0.42ms)
SY 0.01% 0.13% 0.07%
(0.05ms) (0.9ms) (0.69ms)
Table 12: The average percentage latency inflation with
our enhancement when 72 block headers (12 hrs) are
transferred in HTTP body.
(a) Client OH
(b) Client SG
Figure 9: (a) The average latency when client is at OH and
gossips with server at SG, SY and FR, (b) The average
latency when client is at SG and gossips with server at
OH, SY and FR.
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OH SG FR SY
OH 0.09% 0.25% 0.07%
(0.78ms) (1.01ms) (0.48ms)
SG 0.21% 0.16% 0.13%
(1.92ms) (1.10ms) (0.91ms)
FR 0.28% 0.28% 0.07%
(1.08ms) (1.85ms) (0.7ms)
SY 0.04% 0.32% 0.08%
(0.30ms) (2.29ms) (0.84ms)
Table 13: The average percentage latency inflation with
our enhancement when 144 block headers (24 hrs) are
transferred.
(a) Client SY
(b) Client FR
Figure 10: (a) The average latency when client is placed
at SY and gossip with server at OH, SG and FR, (b) The
average latency when client is placed at SG and gossip
with server at OH, SY and FR.
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